The new head of the TSA is thinking of phasing out random screening at the gate for air travel, in an effort to make flying more convenient.
Okay, I certainly applaud his goal. But, just to be contrarian, let me point out that good security is usually security in depth. A computer security expert will tell you that simply putting a kick-ass firewall up still leaves you vulnerable to attacks from within, from connections you didn’t know you had, from things that manage to slip through that outer wall. Just like the Maginot Line, there’s only so much you can do to harden the exterior, and only so much benefit you can get that way.
If your only checkpoint is the main one, then you’d better be rock-solid certain that there’s absolutely no way for it to be bypassed. And even then, it’s a subject worth thinking twice about.
I hate to say it, but I’m starting to believe that most of the security precautions we’ve seen at airports since 9/11 are pointless if our goal is to prevent the use of civilian aircraft as flying bombs.
The reason I say that is that the 9/11 attacks required pilots, flight crews and passengers to expect an old-fashioned, hostage-taking hijacker. Pre-9/11, if a would-be hijacker became violent, the safest strategy was to let him take over the plane, even fly it if he appeared confident, in the hope that after a landing and negotiations all of the passengers and crew would be released.
Post-9/11, everyone is aware that the most likely use of a hijacked aircraft would kill everyone on board. There is no longer an incentive to give in, and a great incentive to fight back, even to crash the plane if necessary in order to save thousands of lives.
That being the case, box cutters would no longer be sufficient to cause another 9/11. Armoring cockpit doors and making the cockpit self-contained are reasonable security precautions. Elaborate, costly and inconvenient screening procedures are not.
That said — perhaps the real reason for increasing security at airports has nothing to do with preventing another building-destroying attack. Perhaps it’s really all about making the flying public *feel* safer, in order to stave off the collapse of the airline industry. In that case, any kind of mumbo-jumbo at the gate may be justified if it increases the perception of safety. But we shouldn’t kid ourself about its results.
Actually, that’s a fine point. I don’t know that it is “most likely” now that a hijack would be to use the plane as a weapon — but certainly there’s going to be an assumption by passengers on the next few hijacked planes that that’s going to be the outcome.
So, yes, box cutters — or tweezers, corkscrews, or pen knives — are not going to be sufficient to hijack a plane successfully. Items of that sort should be taken back off the “forbidden” list.
But that doesn’t invalidate the concept of security in depth. A single point of failure is always dangerous — it’s easier to bypass, or to slip something through. For example, could weapons (including firearms) be slipped through in restaurant supply trucks, and then handed off to a prospective passenger/hijacker who passed “clean” through the main security checkpoint?
I don’t think gate checkpoints are all that inconvenient (and I say that as someone who’s been pulled out of line my fair share or more), and if it adds that much more uncertainty to a hijacker’s plans, I think it’s worth it.