A strategy

John Kerry has written a strategy for Iraq, to address critics who say he’s been stronger on the second-guessing than the actual leadership thang.

There are some positive bits here, though they tend to be of the resolute resolve sort.

… Americans of all political persuasions are united in our determination to succeed. The extremists attacking our forces should know they will not succeed in dividing America, or in sapping American resolve, or in forcing the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops. Our country is committed to help the Iraqis build a stable, peaceful and pluralistic society.

If Bush said that, he’d be criticized for being blind to the looming quagmire. (I expect he’ll say something just like that at his press conference this evening, and I expect to see just that sort of commentary.) If Kerry says it, though, well, that’s resolute statesmanship.

The summary of the Kerry strategy seems to be:

1. Get the UN involved. Commit to “support any plan [UN special rep. Lakhdar Brahimi] proposes that gains the support of Iraqi leaders” regarding an interim Iraqi government.

   Unanswered is the question of why the Iraqis will lend any more credibility to the UN than to the US-led coalition. The UN kept them blockaded. Several of the UN’s Security Council members were in bed with the Saddam regime. Several of the UN Security Council members have past colonial stakes in the area, and are seen as increasingly hostile toward Muslims in their own country, and as being as much interested in “the ooooiiiillll” as the US.

   All the UN inclusion in the Iraqi reconstruction does is open it up to further corruption, and give many, many more international political targets to leverage and play with for those forces, inside Iraq and outside, who don’t want matters there to end in “a stable, peaceful and pluralistic society.”

2. Get more troops from international sources. Get NATO to “create a new out-of-area operation for Iraq under the lead of a U.S. commander.”

   We’ve offered. They’ve declnied, unless they have political (and financial) skin in the game. Which makes you wonder how such a force would actually be organized and run “under the lead of a U.S. commander.”

   And, of course, it makes you wonder how French or German troops are going to be any more successful or less of a target than US, British, Australian, Polish, or Spanish ones.

3. Get international support giving international authority.

   … [I]nternational acceptance of responsibility for stabilizing Iraq must be matched by international authority for managing the remainder of the Iraqi transition. The United Nations, not the United States, should be the primary civilian partner in working with Iraqi leaders to hold elections, restore government services, rebuild the economy, and re-create a sense of hope and optimism among the Iraqi people. The primary responsibility for security must remain with the U.S. military, preferably helped by NATO until we have an Iraqi security force fully prepared to take responsibility.

   Because the UN did such a great job with handling the Iraq situation in the first place.

   I would really like to think that the UN would be better suited toward such nation-building efforts. I cannot, though, think of any similar situations where they’ve done a job that inspires any confidence; indeed, given the Oil-for-Food scandal continuing to unfold, the UN seems particularly unsuited to the task.

   And, again, it’s not clear at all to me that the Iraqi insurgents are going to be any more kindly disposed to a UN transitional authority than a US one, particularly if it doesn’t kow-tow to their particular political interests — and particularly if they know that the UN political process (let alone its military/peacekeeping one) generally dithers more than acts.

4. “[L]evel with our citizens” about our goals.

   Increasingly, the American people are confused about our goals in Iraq, particularly why we are going it almost alone. The president must rally the country around a clear and credible goal. The challenges are significant and the costs are high. But the stakes are too great to lose the support of the American people.

   I would never, ever say, “Listen to the government and accept what they say as Gospel.” Never.

   But the post-war message from the Bush administration has been as clear as anything else from any administration. See the “mission statement” of Kerry’s above. That’s it. The confusion has come from the folks willing to attribute to the Bushies every Deadly Sin in Their Corrupt Mission to Take Over Iraq and Distract from the Economy and Get a Whole Bunch of Oil and Declare Martial Law and Fatten Up Halliburton.

   Given that environment, any restatement of the present goals of the US — “to help the Iraqis build a stable, peaceful and pluralistic society” — will only comfort those willing to believe in Dubya in the first place. For those who think that Bush is an Evil Mastermind or Hapless Puppet of the Neo-Conservative Petro-Military-Industrial Complex, it will be more drivel-as-usual.

The Kerry strategy seems to be Let’s turn over the political responsibility to the UN, though our troops will still take the lead (somehow) on the ground. That creates some great plausible deniability (“They screwed up Iraq!”), but doesn’t seem to stand any better of a chance — if not less of one — than the current US-led effort.

(via Scott)