Much brouhaha about the DoD excluding from Iraq rebuilding contracts companies from countries that did not support — or even opposed — the war. A few thoughts, in part from my perspective working for a country that’s a federal (including DoD) contractor (though not one which is bidding for any work in Iraq):
- While there are many criteria for the federal contracting process — many of which extend it to ridiculous lengths — there is also and always a personal component. If you’ve torqued off the site administration, or have a bad rep with the contracting office, or whatever, you are likely to find your bid rejected, even if it looks really good on paper.
Given that the contracting process cannot be 100% objective (since imponderables like being able to work with the site management, the believability of your claimed ability to do the work promised, the credibility of your approach, the delta between what the site or contract office really wants and what’s in the formal RFP), you can be blackballed formally or informally. In this case, it was a formal process, which may be (intentionally) impolitic, but is also transparent. - Economic boycott (buying or selling) as a political tool is by no means unprecedented, and is usually touted as a much better way to express differences of opinions than, say, war. Why that doesn’t count here is open to question.
- My understanding is that the restriction is on prime contracts, not subs. While there’s certainly cream involved in being the prime, the majority of money for these sorts of things usually ends up going to the subs, which can be from pretty much anywhere.
- The Bush Administration is being lambasted for not playing along with its alllies by offering these contracts up to them, too. While getting into tit-for-tat games can sometimes be unproductive, given that the list is based on those countries that didn’t “play along” with their ally (us) regarding Iraq, why we’re supposed to be the generous ones is an unanswered question.
Especially, one must point out, since many of those countries (and their companies) had relationships and business with Iraq during the Saddam regime.
- Reducing the bidding field could drive up the overall price, and could reduce the overall quality of the work. That’s basic economics. But the effect may not substantial, and the nature of the contracts as awarded will also have an impact. Further, though there are some fine, large European engineering firms, their inclusion doesn’t necessarily mean that cost overruns, corruption, and other malfeasance won’t occur. (Some recent French scandals, for example, argue otherwise.)
Should that be part of the bid eval process? Maybe so. But the folks paying the money usually have some say in the matter.
- The primary disadvantage I see in this is that it further an impression that certain contractors are being favored by their Washington cronies. (In reality, good connections in the contracting process are less reliable than bad ones; i.e., you’re a lot more likely to be blackballed because of past problems or bad relationships than be a shoo-in because of past successes or good relationships).
Caesar’s wife should be beyond reproach. But that can’t trump all other concerns.
Mark Steyn summarizes the issue as follows:
What’s at issue here is whether the American Defence Department should use American taxpayers’ money to offer American government contracts in Iraq to companies from countries that actively obstructed and continue to obstruct American policy in Iraq. That’s a legitimate national security interest, and no more “illegal” than, say, Belgium’s refusal to sell Britain artillery shells during the Gulf War.
The snubbed Euro-weasels were not as pithy as Mr Bush. But the new Canadian Prime Minister, Paul Martin, is worth quoting. “This shouldn’t be just about who gets contracts,” he said. “It ought to be about what is the best thing for the people of Iraq.”
Good point. The best thing for the people of Iraq was to get rid of Saddam, and back in the spring Mr Martin didn’t want to be a part of that. The best thing for the people of Iraq, according to Mr Martin and Herr Schroder and M de Villepin, was that Saddam should be allowed to go on killing and torturing them for another decade or three.
If, say, Saddam’s regime were negotiating for similar work, and left the US out of the bidding for their saber-rattling, nobody would bat an eyelash, even though that would reduce the range of bidders. If France were building a large engineering product in their country, and announced they were limiting bids to French-owned or -based companies, it would be seen as their prerogative (and, in fact, France does just that sort of thing all the time). Lambasting the US for doing something similar on its watch in Iraq smacks of being overly sensitive for the same sort of political posture that the US decision smacks of.