If we had neuralyzers (the cool little memory-blanking widgets from Men in Black), when would it be ethically sound to use them?
Effectively, in fact, we do have them — we have chemicals that can alter brain chemistry, alter our moods, alter ourselves — including, in fact, blotting out memories. When is it proper to use them, and to what ends? Here’s an interesting example of an extreme case.
In my own opinion — yeah, that was probably wrong (though well-motivated). But I’m not sure what bounds I’d want to put on such things, or if such bounds can be said to be actually meaningful. When we’re talking about having ourselves changed — willingly or not — it raises profound ethical, moral, even existential questions.
It is a puzzlement.
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And for whom is cognitive liposuction a bigger quandry? To the theist, who believes there is a nonmaterial essence to a person, and thus it is not an assault on that person’s core? Or to the materialist, who believes that what is materially in the brain is that person’s whole essence? I’m (pardon the expression) damned if I know.
What if there’s a drug that, while not erasing the memory, at least dulls its emotional intensity? Would I be less human if I opted to reduce the sting of my more painful memories? Would the lessons derived from those memories fail to protect me as well from doing something stupid in the future, and possibly hurting someone else I loved?
But I could sleep at night. Maybe.
I think the anesthesiologist did the right thing. The information wasn’t withheld from her, so no lie was told.
This month’s National Geographic cover story is about memory, but they didn’t really cover this aspect.
What the hell was Cmdr. Data so het’ up about, becoming human anyway.
It’s like a time travel paradox. If I could go back and give my past self advice — would I? Or am I the product of my past decisions, and to remove those decisions would be to turn me into someone, if not less, than different.
I have sometimes thought that some situations provide one with only unethical options. I think this is such a situation. I think I’m in a minority of philosophers on this — I think most philosophers assume that in any given situation there is at least one moral option available to the person in that situation. But I think both options available to the anesthesiologist are arguably unethical. If he applies the anesthetic, he has violated the patient’s autonomy and her express wishes. If he does not apply the anesthetic, he exposes the patient and the supervising doctor to potential harms that can be avoided.
I think it’s more than just a puzzlement, I think it’s a serious ethical problem for anyone who finds themselves in such a situation. What I think it tells us is that we are ethically obligated to think far enough ahead to avoid such situations.
As for the connection to changing ourselves, I think situations that change what our future selves will be like are ubiquitous, and only some of them are under our control. Choices we make about our own future are easy enough to see. In addition, any event you witness has the potential to make a big enough impression on you that it will change what your future self will be like. That means that any act a person performs which can be witnessed by another person has the potential to change the witness’ future self. Because such potential changes are so ubiquitous, I think I’m willing to say that they don’t have any special moral significance.
Cool article, thanks for pointing it out.